

RDG Guidance Note: Investigation of Station Stopping Incidents

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About this document

Explanatory Note

The Rail Delivery Group is not a regulatory body and compliance with Guidance Notes or Approved Codes of Practice is not mandatory; they reflect good practice and are advisory only. Users are recommended to evaluate the guidance against their own arrangements in a structured and systematic way, noting that parts of the guidance may not be appropriate to their operations. It is recommended that this process of evaluation and any subsequent decision to adopt (or not adopt) elements of the guidance should be documented. Compliance with any or all of the contents herein, is entirely at an organisation's own discretion.

Other Guidance Notes or Approved Codes of Practice are available on the [Rail Delivery Group \(RDG\) website](#).

Executive Summary:

This Guidance Note provides advice on the investigation of station stopping incidents along with a suggested template form for capturing of the relevant information. In so doing, it seeks to encourage consistency across the industry.

Issue Record

Issue	Date	Comments
One	September 2006	First published version
Two	February 2013	Reviewed and amended to include Stop short and release doors and wrongside door release
Three	April 2016	Reviewed and updated to include different methods of door operation and control
Four	May 2020	Reviewed and amended to clarify Driver Controlled Operation (DCO) and submission of report to industry stakeholders. Updated to RDG format.

This document is reviewed on a regular 3-year cycle.

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1 Purpose and Definitions

1.1 Purpose

This Guidance Note is intended to promote the adoption of standard procedures for the reporting and investigation of station stopping incidents across the industry, along with a common definition of what is meant by these terms. In particular, it provides a suggested template for the capture of all data needed to support such investigations – see Appendix A.

1.2 Definitions

Station Stopping Incident: An overall term that covers Fail to Call, Station overrun, Stop Short and release doors and wrongside door release incidents.

Operational platform: The term for the area of a level platform that is available for passenger use and has been identified as part of the train dispatch area and/or the operation of the train.

Staff responsible for door release: This could be the driver of a Driver Only Operation (DOO) or Driver Controlled Operation (DCO) service or guard, conductor, train manager etc responsible for opening the doors.

Fail/failure to Call: Failure of a train to make a booked station stop in cases where the driver has made no attempt to apply the brake.

Station Overrun Protected: Event in which a train which the driver is attempting to bring to a stand at a station stop proceeds beyond the designated stopping point such that any door(s) intended to be for passenger use at that station is no longer on the operational platform and the staff responsible for door release has not opened the doors or Selective Door Operation (SDO) or Automatic Selective Door Operation (ASDO) has prevented the incorrect doors from being opened in error.

Station Overrun Non-Protected: Event in which a train which the driver is attempting to bring to a stand at a station stop proceeds beyond the designated stopping point such that any door(s) intended to be for passenger use at that station is no longer on the operational platform and have been released or opened by the staff responsible.

Stop Short Protected: Event in which a train comes to a stand prior to the designated stopping point such that some carriages are not adjacent to the operational platform. The doors that are available can be used safely for passenger egress due to the staff responsible for door release not releasing or opening the doors or SDO or ASDO has prevented the incorrect doors from being opened in error.

Stop Short Non-Protected: Event in which a train comes to a stand prior to the designated stopping point such that some carriages are not adjacent to the operational platform and are released or opened by the staff responsible.

Wrongside Door Release: Event in which the train doors are released on the side of the train that is not adjacent to the platform.

Note: The above definition of station overrun excludes overruns at stations with short platforms where the designated stopping point is beyond the end of the platform (i.e. positioned so that the rear rather than front of the train is alongside the platform). As an example, if passengers on an 8 car train have been advised to alight from the rear 5 coaches at a particular station but bringing the train to a stand at the designated stopping point clearly does not constitute a station overrun, even though the front 3 coaches are beyond the platform. However if the train is brought to a stand beyond the designated stopping point such that any of the doors in these 5 coaches are no longer adjacent to the platform, then that constitutes an overrun.

2 Investigations

2.1 Fail to Calls

It is recommended that failures to call be investigated in a similar manner to other station stopping incidents. While many such incidents will result from a failure on the part of the driver which has no direct safety implications (such as misreading of the train's schedule), there may be cases where there is ambiguity as to whether a particular incident was the result of a driver making no attempt to stop at all, or alternatively failing to manage to do so correctly. The form in Appendix A is accordingly designed to be used for all station stopping incidents.

2.2 Significant Operating Incident Occurring as a result of a Station Stopping Incident

If a station stopping incident results in a significant operating incident such as a SPAD or a collision then the investigation procedures for these types of incidents should be applied rather than those referred to in this document, however the contents of this document may be used as an aide memoire.

2.3 Action to be Taken Immediately Following a Station Stopping Incident

It is recommended that in the event of any reported station stopping incident the driver concerned should be seen by a responsible Manager at the first available opportunity and an interview carried out to determine:

- the immediate cause (as reported by the driver)
- for station overruns only:
 - the distance overrun,
 - whether the train set back, and if so, whether authority was requested/obtained from the signaller,
 - whether the driver changed ends.
- for stop short and release doors, and wrongside door release:
 - Whether any passengers alighted from a passenger door that was not adjacent to the level platform.
 - Whether the area surrounding the train was checked for passengers that may have fallen/alighted from the train prior to any further movements taking place.

The staff responsible for the incident's fitness to continue duty should also be assessed.

The driver, along with other staff if appropriate, must complete a written report of the circumstances as soon as practicable after the incident and as a minimum prior to booking off duty.

2.4 On Train Data Recorder (OTDR)

OTDR data must be downloaded when a station stopping incident is reported.

2.5 Investigation Procedure

A competent person must be appointed to investigate a station stopping incident. All relevant sections of the form provided in Appendix A should be completed.

When completed, it should be submitted for internal sign off according to individual Company procedures and as appropriate to Network Rail and other Industry Stakeholders for acceptance of the conclusion and any recommendations that may apply to them. Incident details and the investigation conclusions and recommendations must be input to Safety Management Intelligence System (SMIS).

2.6 Liaison with Network Rail and other Industry Stakeholders

The person appointed to conduct the investigation should liaise, as appropriate with Network Rail and other Industry Stakeholders, to establish and discuss the circumstances. In particular, the results of

any Network Rail led investigations into the state of the infrastructure (swab test, eddy current test, etc.) can provide valuable evidence of railhead conditions and an indication as to the operation of on-train sanding equipment.

2.7 Sources of Evidence

In conducting the investigation, the investigator should consider the following as additional potential sources of evidence in addition to reports from staff involved:

- OTDR data
- CCTV images from station and/or train internal CCTV
- Forward Facing / Rear Facing CCTV
- Signallers' and witness' reports, including Guards and Train Dispatchers
- Evidence of causes of distraction (internal / external)
 - Mobile phone records (for examples calls / texts)
 - Authorised / unauthorised cab visitors
- Voice recordings
- Employee Medical Results
- Railhead Swab Test results – this may need to be specifically requested from Network Rail
- Operation of the Rail Head Treatment Train (RHTT) on affected or adjacent lines
- Driver's schedule card / train list being used
- Any Not to Stop / Special Stop Orders that may have been issued
- TOC/FOC/Network Rail Control Centre Log Entry or P2/CCF replays
- Medical Examination
- Fatigue Risk Index data
- Competence Management System (CMS) documentation
- Fleet Engineering
 - A technical report must be obtained to substantiate any allegations of a defect on the train
 - Dependent on the nature and/or seriousness of the incident, consideration should also be given to requesting a download of data held in Train Management and Brake Control Systems (where available)
 - Correct operation and status of sanding equipment

Appendix A

Template Form for Investigation of Station Stopping Incidents

Please note the following form has been designed to be completed electronically as a Word form. Where indicated, guidance text for completion of the form is provided with the instruction that it be deleted from individual completed report.

STATION STOPPING INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Type of incident
Train details
Location
Date and time
Driver and home depot
SMIS Reference

Produced by:

Name,
Job Title
Location

Authorised by:

Name,
Job Title
Location

Date: _____

Contents

Part 1	Incident overview
Part 2	Infrastructure and Station details
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Part 4a	Driver details
Part 4b	Guard/ Train Manager/ Conductor details
Part 4c	Dispatcher details
Part 5	Additional information
Part 6	Summary of events
Part 7	Factors for consideration
Part 8	Conclusions and causes
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Part 10	Required action to address non-compliances
Part 11	Recommendations
Part 12	Report compiled by

Part 1 - Incident overview

Date of incident: **Time:** **SMIS Ref. No.:**

Location of incident: **Line:**

Train: Train ID.: Time: From: To:

Driver's name: **Depot:**

If other than booked driver, give details No. of persons in cab:

Stock: Leading unit† no.: Vehicle no.: Nos. of other units† in train:

Driven from: Vehicle / cab No.: How was incident reported?

Weather Conditions: **Visibility:**

Overrun Distance:	<input type="text"/>	(metres)	Gradient:	<input type="text"/>
Permissible speed:	<input type="text"/>	(mph)	Approach view (restricted/ open/ view station from braking point.)	<input type="text"/>

Consequences: (tick)

Train did not return to the platform	<input type="checkbox"/>	Train not permitted to return to the platform	<input type="checkbox"/>
Train returned to the platform with permission	<input type="checkbox"/>	Train returned to the platform without permission	<input type="checkbox"/>
If train returned to the platform, was the correct cab used? (Y/N)	<input type="checkbox"/>	If No state reason	<input type="text"/>

Level crossing involved
(see below)

☐ Collision/ Near miss with another train* ☐

Collision with
fixed
infrastructure

☐

*If so, give
details*

Infrastructure
Damage

☐

*If so, give
details*

Passenger/
employee
Injuries

☐

*If so, give
details*

Station stop details:

Consider:

History of station stopping incidents –

What type of incidents and when.

*Have these been highlighted to
traincrew*

Regular or irregular stopping point

*Is this regular work for the
traincrew/depot*

† Set number(s) (for example BN54) for locomotive worked services.

* As a result of a station overrun at an occupied permissive platform.

Part 2 - Infrastructure details

Level Crossing: *If level crossing involved, state type and any consequences*

N/A	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Whistle Board reacted to	<input type="checkbox"/>		
AHB	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCTV	<input type="checkbox"/>
Manual gates	<input type="checkbox"/>	Manual barriers	<input type="checkbox"/>
Foot crossing	<input type="checkbox"/>	Traincrew operated	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<i>If so, give details :</i> <input type="text"/>	
Level crossing closed to traffic	<input type="checkbox"/>	Level crossing open to traffic	<input type="checkbox"/>
Level crossing in process of closing	<input type="checkbox"/>	Collision with road vehicle or crossing gates	<input type="checkbox"/>
Near miss with road vehicle	<input type="checkbox"/>	Injuries / fatality (including pedestrians)	<input type="checkbox"/>

Railhead conditions

reported by driver: (tick)

Dry ☐ Wet ☐ Greasy ☐ Leaf affected ☐ Other contamination ☐

Was incident attributed to railhead conditions? (Y/N) ☐

If yes

Did Network Rail confirm poor railhead? (Y/N)

Does OTDR indicate poor railhead adhesion? (Y/N)

Was railhead swab/ eddy current tested (Y/N)

Had railhead treatment been applied? (Y/N)

Has RHTT/Water Jetting taken place on affected or adjacent lines (Y/N)

If Yes state

If Yes state

If Yes state

Date /Time railhead treatment applied prior to incident

Date

Time

Are Traction Gel Applicators fitted near this location? (Y/N)

Where?

Reason for poor railhead

Is location a known poor railhead adhesion location, i.e. listed in Sectional Appendix? (Y/N)

What time was the last rail movement prior to this incident of the section of line?

Had there been any reports of LRA in this area in the preceding 24hours (Y/N)

If yes, what actions were taken

Station Infrastructure

Are there multiple stopping points? (Y/N)

If yes, give details

Are the stopping points clearly visible to the driver of an approaching train? (Y/N)

If no, give details

Is there any special stopping instructions for this location (for example stopping points beyond the platform)? (Y/N)

If so, give details

Are stopping points boards on the same side as the platform? (Y/N)

If no, give details

Is DOO equipment on the same side as the platform? (Y/N)

If no, give details

Are station staff (dispatchers) provided at this location? (Y/N)

Was station lighting fitted, operable and sufficient? (Y/N)

If no, give details

Overrun/ Stop Overrun Door Release, Stop Short Release Doors and Wrong Side Door Release Incidents

How many doors were not adjacent to the level platform when the doors were released?

Did any passengers alight from the train to **other** than the level platform (i.e. alighted onto the platform ramp or ballast)? (Y/N)

If so, give details

Was the immediate area surrounding the train checked following the incident and prior to any other train movements taking place? (Y/N)

If no, give details

Is the train operator of the train involved in the incident the Station Facility Operator at the station concerned? (Y/N)

If no, give details

How long were the train doors incorrectly released for?

(mm.ss)

Was automatic SDO working correctly?

Was manual SDO operated?

Give details

Part 3 - Train details

Type of brake: Brake control Type of brake gear

Sanding Equipment	Sanding equipment fitted?	<input type="checkbox"/>	If Yes, which type?	<input type="text"/>
	Was sanding equipment functioning?	<input type="text"/>		
	Is WSP fitted and is there evidence of its operation on the OTDR?	<input type="text"/>		
	Date sanding equipment last examined (functional test)	<input type="text"/>		
	Date and location sanding equipment last replenished	<input type="text"/>		

On Train Safety Equipment	Was any on-train safety equipment defective or isolated at the time of the incident? (Y/N)	<input type="checkbox"/>	If so, give details	<input type="text"/>
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Vehicle defects

For each unit/vehicle in the train formation, please enter details of any relevant safety related defects reported during the previous 14 days

Unit/Vehicle Number	Defect Details

Part 4a - Driver details

Date of birth Date entered service Date passed as driver

Has driver been involved in any safety of the line incidents in the previous 2 years, Is the driver PQA or currently on a CDP process and/or, currently participating in a Driver (Competence) Development Plan? (Y/N)

(Please enter details)

Was there a known defect on the train, or other issues with route or traction knowledge? (Y/N)

(If Yes, please state)

Was the driver adhering to the Company Driving Policy? (Y/N)

(If No, give reasons)

Details of hours worked during the previous 14 days

Please enter details of the hours and duties worked by the driver during the previous 14 days. *NOTE: If the Driver has been involved in a Safety of the Line incident during the period shown below, this must be recorded.*

Day	Date (dd/mm/yy)	No. continuous days worked	Time on duty (hh:mm)	Time off duty (hh:mm)	Activity (see below)	Duty No/Comments
Incident						
-1						
-2						
-3						
-4						
-5						
-6						
-7						
-8						
-9						
-10						
-11						
-12						
-13						
-14						

Activities: **A** - Annual leave **B** - Booked Off **D** - Worked rest day **N** - Worked Sunday
 O - Other **R** - Rest day off **S** - Sick **V** - Worked overtime
 W - Worked ordinary time **X** - Special leave

Fatigue Risk Index
Assessment details

FRI Index:

Depot Average:

Did driver allege fatigue

Give details if there is technical evidence of fatigue
(slow reactions identified on OTDR)

Part 4b – Guard/ Train Manager/ Conductor details

Date of birth Date entered service Date passed as guard

Has Guard been involved in any safety of the line incidents in the previous 2 years, Is the guard PQA or currently on a CDP process and/or, currently participating in a guard (Competence) Development Plan? (Y/N)

(Please enter details)

Was there a known defect on the train, or other issues with route or traction knowledge? (Y/N)

(If Yes, please state)

Was the guard adhering to the Professional Guards Handbook? (Y/N)

(If No, give reasons)

Details of hours worked during the previous 14 days

Please enter details of the hours and duties worked by the guard during the previous 14 days. *NOTE: If the guard has been involved in a Safety of the Line incident during the period shown below, this must be recorded.*

Day	Date (dd/mm/yy)	No. continuous days worked	Time on duty (hh:mm)	Time off duty (hh:mm)	Activity (see below)	Duty No/Comments
Incident						
-1						
-2						
-3						
-4						
-5						
-6						
-7						
-8						
-9						
-10						
-11						
-12						
-13						
-14						

Activities: **A** - Annual leave **B** - Booked Off **D** - Worked rest day **N** - Worked Sunday
O - Other **R** - Rest day off **S** - Sick **V** - Worked overtime
W - Worked ordinary time **X** - Special leave **Z** - Worked Emergency call out

Fatigue Risk Index
Assessment details

FRI Index:

Depot Average:

Did guard allege fatigue

Part 4c - Dispatcher details

Date of birth Date entered service Date passed as dispatcher

Has dispatcher been involved in any safety of the line incidents in the previous 2 years, Is the dispatcher PQA or currently on a CDP process and/or, currently participating in a dispatcher (Competence) Development Plan? (Y/N)

(Please enter details)

Was there a known defect with station dispatch equipment? (Y/N)

(If Yes, please state)

Was the dispatcher adhering to the Company Dispatch Policy? (Y/N)

(If No, give reasons)

Details of hours worked during the previous 14 days

Please enter details of the hours and duties worked by the dispatcher during the previous 14 days. *NOTE: If the dispatcher has been involved in a Safety of the Line incident during the period shown below, this must be recorded.*

Day	Date (dd/mm/yy)	No. continuous days worked	Time on duty (hh:mm)	Time off duty (hh:mm)	Activity (see below)	Duty No/Comments
Incident						
-1						
-2						
-3						
-4						
-5						
-6						
-7						
-8						
-9						
-10						
-11						
-12						
-13						
-14						

Activities: **A** - Annual leave **B** - Booked Off **D** - Worked rest day **N** - Worked Sunday
O - Other **R** - Rest day off **S** - Sick **V** - Worked overtime
W - Worked ordinary time **X** - Special leave **Z** - Worked Emergency call out

Fatigue Risk Index
Assessment details

FRI Index:

Depot Average:

Did dispatcher allege
fatigue

Part 5 - Additional information (*Fail to Call/Overrun only*)

Driver explanation of reason for failure to call/overrun: (*tick*)

Misread timetable/schedule card ☐ Forgot ☐ Distraction ☐ Other ☐

If Distraction or Other, please give details

Type of schedule: (*tick*)

WTT ☐ WTT Variation ☐ STP ☐ VSTP ☐ Control Arrangement ☐ Special Stop Order ☐

Part 6 - Summary of events

The information (evidence) presented should follow a sequence of events. The aim is to tell a logical story of what happened. This can be based upon a simple timeline to make sure key facts are included in the correct order. Follow this up with any other factors that have emerged during the course of the investigation that do not naturally fit in the story. The information presented in this section should relate to, and support the conclusions.

Insert text as appropriate.

Part 7 - Factors for consideration

This section is to highlight for the reader how information has been correlated and cross-referenced in order to make sound judgements. It needs to highlight conflicting information and where information is missing.

Insert text as appropriate.

Part 8 - Conclusions and causes

Avoid using single line statements in this section where possible and make sure that the cause is properly described. This should cover two key elements, i.e.

1. *Immediate cause: An unsafe act and/or condition that directly resulted in the occurrence of the event. Concentrate on the people involved and the environment in which they work. There can be more than one such cause. (Make sure there is a 'because' and not just a statement of fact)*
2. *Underlying cause: This relates to the underlying conditions and issues which caused or allowed the unsafe act or condition to occur. Consider: management and supervisory practice, job planning, equipment maintenance and other human factor influences*

When stating and explaining the causes, there should be a focus on what needs to be improved as much as on what went wrong. This method softens the impact to the reader and removes any emotion from the report.

Insert text as appropriate.

Part 9 - Other factors

In this section, record any other issues that were noted in the summary of events, which needs improving, although it did not form part of the identified causes (Part 8).

Insert text as appropriate

Part 10 - Required action to address non-compliances

This section states the actions required to address issues of non-compliance. This is where an existing control measure is already in place and has not been followed (e.g. a rule, regulation or process). Non-compliances differ significantly from recommendations, as the existing control measures are deemed adequate and robust. All actions stated under this section are mandated.

Make short two or three line statements.

Between this section and that containing the recommendations (Part 11), all the issues identified in Part 8 (causes) and Part 9 (other factors) must be addressed.

Insert text as appropriate.

Part 11 - Recommendations

This section documents suggested changes that focus on improvement to existing controls or the introduction of new controls. Sometimes reasoning for your suggestions may be necessary.

Make short two or three line statements.

Always make sure the recommendation has a champion identified.

Between this section and non-compliances, all the issues identified in Part 8 (causes) and Part 9 (other factors) must be addressed.

Remember, recommendations should be SMART. (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound)

Insert text as appropriate.

Part 12 – Report compiled by

Report compiled by

Name

Signature

Job title

Date

Professional Head of Operations verification

Name

Signature

Job title

Date

Network Rail acceptance of report (where applicable)

Name

Signature

Job title

Date

Other Stakeholder acceptance of report (where applicable)

Name

Signature

Job title
and
Company

Date

Rail Delivery Group



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